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INTRODUCTION

Recent well-publicized controversies concerning the Bridgestone/Firestone tire
defect litigation,' the escalating number of clergy sexual abuse claims,2 and highdollar Wall Street securities scandals3 have refocused national attention upon the
issue of court secrecy. In particular, the role that confidentiality orders, sealing
orders, and confidential settlements played in those lawsuits has fueled the debate
over whether a dangerous excess of secrecy infects our civil justice system.4 In the
Firestone litigation, for example, the recall of over fourteen million potentially
dangerous tires and the subsequent congressional investigation into Firestone and
Ford's alleged culpability came eight years after the first of numerous product
liability lawsuits concerning a tire that has now been linked to over two hundred and
fifty deaths in the United States alone.5 Many of those Firestone cases were kept
secret under agreed protective orders, sealing orders, and confidential settlements.6
Prior to these recent scandals, similar lawsuits, involving products like GM's sidemounted gas tanks, the Dalkon shield, the Shiley heart valve, and similar products
and environmental hazards, flew below public radar cloaked by confidentiality
orders and secret settlements.7 Confidential settlements and secrecy orders have
been the subject of vigorous and heated debate in this country since the early to
mid- 1990s.' In response, a number of states enacted "sunshine in litigation" statutes
or rules designed to reduce the level of secrecy in their courts by restricting judicial
discretion to issue confidentiality orders.9 The Firestone scandal renewed these

1. See Roselyn Bonanti et al., The Message of the Firestone/FordTragedy, TRIAL, Apr. 2001,

at 52; Bridgestone-FirestoneSettlement Approved, CNN.com, March 15, 2004.
2. See Stephanie S. Abrutyn, Commentary, Courts are Just as Guilty in Church Coverup,
HARTFORD (Conn.) COURANT,May 26,2002, at C 1;Pam Belluck, Judge Denies Church'sBid to Seal
Records on Priests,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2002, at Al 8; Ken Maguire, Boston Archdiocese Records
Show Drug Use, Sex Abuse by Priests,NEWSDAY, Dec. 4, 2002.
3. See Martha Neil, Confidential Settlements Scrutinized, A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 20, 22
(reporting on proposal to change rules concerning settlement of broker complaints).
4. See generallyLaurie Kratky Dor, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999) (examining the role of secrecy
agreements in our judicial system) [hereinafter Dord, Secrecy by Consent].
5. Bridgestone-FirestoneSettlement Approved, supra note 1.
6. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001)
(discussing right of press to obtain sealed discovery in settled case involving tire tread separation).
7. See Dorf, Secrecy by Consent,supra note 4, at 300-01 & n.76.
8. For a discussion of the various opposing arguments made in this debate, see Dor6, Secrecy by
Consent, supra note 4, at 300-09; Laurie Kratky Dor, The ConfidentialityDebate and the Push to
Regulate Secrecy in Civil Litigation, The 2000 Roscoe Pound Institute Forum for State Court Judges:
Secrecy Practices in the Courts (July 29,2000), availableat www.roscoepound.org/new/OOKratky.pdf.
9. Besides South Carolina, approximately eighteen states have enacted some type ofsunshine rule
or statute aimed at reducing the level of secrecy in their courts. The breadth of these rules varies greatly.
Texas and Florida possess the earliest and broadest of these reforms. See FLA. SrAT. ANN. § 69.081
(West Supp. 2004) (prohibiting concealment of public hazards); TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (creating
presumption ofpublic access to "court records" that include unfiled settlement agreements and unfiled
pretrial discovery that "have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the
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reform efforts and prompted at least thirteen states to consider legislation that would
restrict secrecy orders and agreements in cases that could compromise public
safety.'"
Although these recent proposals failed to make it out of their respective
statehouses, the federal and state judiciaries in the State of South Carolina recently
adopted their own "sunshine" rules governing the sealing ofsettlements and judicial
records. " Indeed, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina
became the first federal court in the nation to prohibit outright the sealing of

administration of public office, or the operation of government").
Reform efforts have been less ambitious in other states. Some statutes concern only discovery and
protective orders. See ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2) (requiring findings of fact concerning non-stipulated
protective orders governing discovery); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie 2000) (providing that
protective orders issued in personal injury or wrongful death cases shall not prohibit sharing of
discovery in similar or related matters).
The majority of states confine reform to the sealing ofjudicial records. See CAL. APP. CT. R. 12.5;
CAL. CT. R. 243.1-243.4 (prescribing procedures for sealing of court records in trial and appellate
courts); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128(8) (West Supp. 2003) (disfavoring stipulated reversal or vacatur
of judgments); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 11-20(A) (effective July 1, 2003) (prohibiting sealing of
materials "on file or lodged with the court or in connection with a court proceeding" absent notice to
interested parties and affirmative trial court findings); DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 5(g); DEL. CH.CT. R.
5(g); DEL. Sup. CT. R. 9(bb) (requiring judicial determination that good cause exists for continued seal
of court records); GA. SUPER. CT. R. 21 (establishing procedural and substantive requirements for
sealing of judicial records); IDAHO CT. R. 32(f) (requiring that court make factual finding "as to
whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates" before sealingjudicial records in the
least restrictive fashion); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-5.5 (Michie 2001) (requiring specific balancing
of interests, findings of fact, and conclusions of law before sealing "judicial public record"); LA. CODE
Civ. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(C)-(E) (West Supp. 2003) (prohibiting protective order regarding discovery
or sealing of records if information relates to public hazard); MASS. UNIF. R. IMPOUNDMENT P. 7
(noting that party agreement is insufficient in itself to constitute good cause necessary to impound
papers, documents, or exhibits and directing that court consider other enumerated "relevant factors");
MICH. CT. R. 8.119(F)(4) (limiting court's discretion to seal any "documents and records of any nature
that are filed with the clerk"); UNIF. R. N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTS. § 216.1 (requiring written finding of
good cause and consideration of public interest before sealing court records).
Still others aim at particular hazards like product liability or toxic torts. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-55-122 (Michie Supp. 2003) (voiding settlement agreement or provision concealing environmental
hazard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.61 l(4)(b) (West Supp. 2004) (restricting confidentiality
provisions in court order or private agreement that involve product liability or hazardous substance
claims).
Finally, some states restrict their regulation to settlements with a governmental party. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 25-18-401 (Michie Supp. 2002) (prohibiting governmental agency from agreeing to
confidential settlement or seeking secrecy order concerning settlement terms); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1321.3 (2003) (restricting agencies of government or its subdivisions from entering into confidential
settlements without "overriding interest"); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.402 (2001) (prohibiting public body
from entering into confidential settlement).
For a discussion of these various sunshine statutes and rules, see generally Dor6, Secrecy by
Consent, supra note 4, at 310-14.
10. See Diana Digges, ConfidentialSettlements Under Fire in 13 States, LAW. WKLY. USA, Apr.
30, 2001, at 353 (noting then-pending legislative proposals).
11. D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03 (amended effective Nov. 1, 2002) (prohibiting sealing of settlement
agreements filed with the court); S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1 (establishing factors that courts should balance
in deciding whether to seal documents and settlement agreements).
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settlement agreements filed with the court. 2 Significant controversy and media
coverage accompanied the adoption of these South Carolina antisecrecy rules-thus
providing ample fodder for this Symposium.
One significant facial difference between the federal and state rules in South
Carolina concerns the scope and role of judicial discretion in the decision to seal
confidential settlements. On its face, the federal rule removes all discretion from
the hands of the trial court, which must refuse the settling parties' request to seal
their compromise. 3 In contrast, the Supreme Court of South Carolina declined to
adopt such a bright-line approach and instead chose to guide judicial discretion by
factors that a court must consider
enumerating various public and private balancing
14
before sealing court records or settlements.
This Article explores this difference in approach and suggests that,

notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the South Carolina rules, a blanket ban
on the sealing of settlement agreements will likely have very limited impact on
either court secrecy or confidential settlements.'5 Instead, judicial attention would
be better focused upon the myriad other ways in which courts are asked to
participate in and facilitate such compromises. 6 For example, settling parties
frequently move to maintain agreed protective orders that governed discovery
produced during the settled dispute.' 7 They may condition their compromise on the

sealing of discovery, pleadings, exhibits, or sometimes even entire court files.'" Or,
they may request entry of a confidentiality order that restricts disclosure, not only
of the terms and amount of their settlement, but sometimes even the underlying facts
9
and documentary evidence upon which the lawsuit was premised.'

These

occasions for judicial involvement present more potent opportunities for judicial

12. Only one other federal district court in the country has a local rule directed exclusively at
sealed settlement agreements. The Eastern District of Michigan limits the duration that settlements may
remain sealed with the court. E.D. MICH. LOCALR. 5.4. See Tim Reagan et al., Federal Judicial Center,
Sealed Settlement Agreements in Federal District Court, April 2004, at 3 (on file with author)
[hereinafter FJC Report].
13. D.S.C. LOCALR. 5.03.
14. S.C.R. Civ. P. 41.1.
15. See infra Part II (describing the South Carolina federal and state rules).
16. See infra Part III (discussing judicial involvement in confidential settlements).
17. See, e.g., Griffith v. Univ. Hosp., L.L.C., 249 F.3d 658, 662-63 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing
settlement conditioned on maintenance of discovery protective order); Banco Popular de Puerto Rico
v. Greenblatt, 964 F.2d 1227, 1229 (1 st Cir. 1992) (examining stipulated protective order embodied
in agreed judgment).
18. See, e.g., Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,1311 (11 th Cir.
2001) (requiring heightened scrutiny of request to seal entire case record); Brownv. Advantage Eng'g,
Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11 th Cir. 1992) (noting defendant's agreement to settle for more than
previous offers "in exchange for [the plaintiffs] agreement that the record be sealed"); City of Hartford
v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1991) (conditioning settlement on sealing of court file).
19. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998) (assessing settlement that barred
former employee from voluntarily testifying against employer in other product liability cases);
Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363 (D. Nev. 1993) (evaluating settlement that barred plaintiff from
discussing any aspect of her employment with defendant).
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vigilance and oversight of court secrecy. 2° Rather than knee-jerk rejection, courts
should confront these opportunities with informed discretion-a discretion that
accounts for the case-specific and frequently competing public and private interests
relevant to "good cause '' 2 and that utilizes the rationale for open courts as its
compass.22

II. THE NEW SOUTH CAROLINA ANTI-SECRECY RULES
A. The FederalLocalRule

Effective November 1, 2002, the ten judges of the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina amended their Local Rule 5.03 to prohibit the
sealing of settlement agreements filed with the court. New subsection (c) of Local
Rule 5.03 provides: "No settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be sealed
pursuant to the terms of this Rule. 23 In so doing, South Carolina became the first
federal judicial district in the country to adopt a strict bright-line rule prohibiting the
sealing of settlements.24
This most recent amendment generated significant opposition among members
of the South Carolina Bar.25 Supporters of the amendment argued that banning
court-sanctioned secret settlements would permit timely public access to
information concerning product hazards, government malfeasance, environmental
dangers, medical malpractice, and other threats to public health and welfare.
Opponents argued that a ban on sealing orders would chill settlements, further clog
congested courts, increase insurance premiums, and infringe privacy and property
interests.
In actuality, however, the local federal rule will likely have limited impact on
either court secrecy or confidential settlements. The local rule applies only to
settlement agreements that are presented to the court for filing and approval.
However, only a small number of cases-those involving minors or class actions,

20. See infra Part IV. (discussing judicial oversight of confidential settlements).
21. See infra Part W.A. (discussing private and public considerations relevant to good cause).
22. See infra Part IV.B. (discussing how the rationale for open courts may guide judicial
discretion concerning confidential settlements).
23. D.S.C. LOcALR. 5.03(c).
24. Any of the local rules of the District of South Carolina may be suspended or modified "[f]or
good cause shown in a particular case." D.S.C. LOCALR. 1.02. To the extent applicable to Local Rule
5.03(c), then, this potential "loophole" may permit courts to exercise more discretion to seal filed
settlements than the unqualified language of the new rule may suggest.
25. See BNA, Inc., South CarolinaFederalCourt Adopts Rule That Will End Sealing of Some
Settlements, 71 U.S. LAW WKLY., Nov. 26, 2002, at 2342 (describing controversy); Clif LeBlanc,
Secret Settlements Banned: FederalJudges Approve Strict Rules; State Courts Might Seek Similar
Ban, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 7,2002 (stating that South Carolina lawyers opposed new rule
2 to 1). See also James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine In: "Sunshine" Laws Do Not "Chill"
Settlements, Say Advocates of Open Courts, TRIAL, June 2003, at 18, 20 (describing opposition to
proposed South Carolina rule amendments).
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for instance-require that settlements be submitted to or approved by the court,2 6
and even then, the settlement itself will generally contain only limited information
regarding the underlying facts or documents in the case.2 7
As discussed further below, the majority of cases settled confidentially involve
no court filing other than the stipulation of dismissal.28 In such cases,
confidentiality, like other settlement terms, becomes a matter of private contract that
entails no judicial scrutiny or involvement.29 Moreover, the local rule explicitly
does not limit "the ability of the parties, by agreement, to restrict access to
documents which are not filed with the Court."3 Thus, unfiled discovery, even if
relevant to public health, safety, or welfare, may remain confidential pursuant to
private protective agreements. 3' Although other provisions police the sealing of
judicial records or court files,32 the rule does not address requests to issue or
maintain protective orders governing discovery produced in the settled case. Nor
does it guide courts asked to issue confidentiality orders that incorporate private
nondisclosure agreements.33 The local federal rule thus does not regulate many of
the other more prevalent means by which courts arguably endorse secrecy in
settlement.34
B. South CarolinaRule of Civil Procedure41.1
Following the lead of the federal judiciary in South Carolina, the Supreme

26. See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (discussing the small subset of disputes that
require such judicial review).
27. See Huffy Corp. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 823, 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003)
(recognizing that much of settlement contained "routine verbiage which appears in most settlement
agreements"). See also FJCReport, supra note 12, at 10 (concluding that "generally the only thing
kept secret by the sealing [of settlements] is the amount of settlement").
28. See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002).
29. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing the wide latitude parties possess
to privately contract for confidentiality).
30. D.S.C. LOCALR. 5.03.
31. "[P]rotective agreements intended to limit access to and use of materials gained in discovery"
do not require prior judicial approval. D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03.
32. The 2002 amendments to Local Rule 5.03 relate only to the sealing of filed settlement
agreements. Requests to seal documents other than settlements are governed by separate provisions of
the rule. Subsections (A) and (B) of Local Rule 5.03, adopted in 2001, prohibit the sealing of
documents filed with the court unless strict procedural requirements are satisfied. D.S.C. LOCAL R.
5.03(A)-(B). Under that mandatory procedure, a party seeking to file documents under seal must
specifically identify the particular "documents or portions thereof for which sealing is requested" and
"state the reasons why sealing is necessary." Id. at 5.03(A)(l)-(2). The motion to seal must further
explain "why less drastic alternatives to sealing will not afford adequate protection" and address
various public and private factors set forth in applicable case law. Id. at 5.03(A)(3)-(4). The rule
additionally requires the clerk ofthe court to provide public notice of the motion to seal. Id. at 5.03(B).
33. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
34. The Federal Judicial Center has recently completed its exhaustive study of the prevalence of
sealed settlement agreements filed in federal district court. That study concludes that "[s]ealed
settlement agreements are rare in Federal court. They occur in less than one-half of one percent of civil
cases." FJC Report, supra note 12, at 9.
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Court of South Carolina adopted a new rule of civil procedure to govern the sealing
of documents and settlement agreements. South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure
41.1, effective May 5, 2003, establishes guidelines intended to aid a court in
balancing "the right of public access to court records with the need for parties to
protect truly private or proprietary information from public view and to insure that
rules of court are fairly applied."35 The state rule does not apply to private
settlement agreements, but "shall not be interpreted as approving confidentiality
provisions in private settlement agreements where the parties agree to have the
36
matter voluntarily dismissed... without court involvement." In addition to mir37
roring the federal local procedures concerning the sealing of records, the state rule
directs courts to consider specific balancing factors. These concerns include:
(1) the need to ensure a fair trial; (2) the need for witness
cooperation; (3) the reliance of the parties upon expectations of
confidentiality; (4) the public or professional significance of the
lawsuit; (5) the perceived harm to the parties from disclosure; (6)
why alternatives other than sealing the documents are not
available to protect legitimate private interests... ; and (7) why
the public interest, including, but not limited to, the public health
and safety, is best served by sealing the documents.38
Finally, settlement agreements submitted for court approval "shall not be
conditioned upon [their] being filed under seal."3 9 Although the rule originally
proposed by the supreme court would have altogether banned the sealing of filed
settlements, that blanket prohibition now applies only to settlements involving "a
public body or institution."4 When considering whether to approve the sealing of
nongovernmental settlements, a court must engage in the balancing of public and
private interests enumerated in the new rule.'" Thus, the state rule does not go as
far as the federal local rule in altogether banning confidential filed settlements, but
instead guides courts in balancing the desire for confidentiality against the need for
public access.42

35. S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1(a).

36. Id.
37. See supra note 32.
38. S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1(b)(1)-(7).

39. Id. at 41.1(c).
40. Id. ("Under no circumstances shall a court approve sealing a settlement agreement which
involves a public body or institution."). See infra notes 105-13 and accompanying text (discussing
why the presence of a governmental litigant might militate against entry of a confidentiality order).

41. Id. at41.1 (c)(l)-(4). Except for concerns regarding a fair trial, witness cooperation, and party

expectations, the factors for sealing a settlement that a court must address mirror those for sealing
records.
42. Erie-like concerns with vertical forum shopping may arise if this facial difference in rules
leads to differences in result concerning the sealing of settlement agreements in state versus federal
court in South Carolina. See Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party
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III. JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENTS

Opponents of antisecrecy rules like those recently enacted in South Carolina
virtually all contend that restricting the ability of litigants to settle their cases
confidentially will "chill" settlements and further burden an already overtaxed court
system.43 This principal criticism, however, probably overstates the risk that
"sunshine" poses to settlement. Settlements would likely continue to occur without

secrecy given the costly, time-consuming, and risky alternative of trial."
Confidentiality does, however, undoubtedly facilitate the settlement process, and
many compromises could not be reached in the absence of a confidentiality
covenant.45
A.

Confidentiality Through Private Contract

Neither the federal nor the state rules in South Carolina impede the ability of
litigants to contract privately for confidentiality as a condition of their
compromise.' Left to their own devices, litigants possess wide latitude to craft
provisions that will cloak their settlements with seemingly impenetrable layers of
confidentiality. Settling parties, for instance, may provide for the destruction or
return of potentially incriminatory documents produced during discovery or agree
to abide by the nondisclosure provisions of a stipulated protective order following

Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 98 (2000) ("Neither the possibility of protection nor a threat of
disclosure should become a motivation for forum shopping."). But see Jack B. Weinstein & Catherine
Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 24 (2001) (suggesting that approach
toward court secrecy "should ... be deemed procedural so that ...federal court[s] would not have to
apply the laws of fifty states").
43. See Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
457, 484-85 (1991) (contending that sunshine reforms impede settlement); Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality,Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REV. 427, 429
(1991) (arguing that confidentiality is "essential" to settlement).
44. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994) (predicting that
settlements will likely be entered regardless of confidentiality promise (quoting United States v. Ky.
Utils. Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 (E.D. Ky. 1989), rev'd, 927 F.2d 252 (6th Cir. 1991)). See also
Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 95 (finding it"unlikely that even a total ban on confidentiality provisions
would be a major deterrent to settlement").
45. See Michael F. Connolly, Esq., Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc., Winning
ThroughSettlement: EnforcementorRescission ofSettlementAgreements, § 13.4.2 (2001) (describing
confidentiality as a "highly valuable bargained-for term" without which "parties are loathe to settle");
David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2656 (1995)
(admitting that some settlements will collapse without confidentiality); Weinstein & Wimberly, supra
note 42, at 7, 20 (discussing how confidentiality assists in settlements that often require "some sort of
secrecy agreement").
46. South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 41.1, however, prohibits parties seeking court
approval of their compromise from conditioning it upon its being filed under seal. S.C. R. Civ. P.
4 1.1(c).
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dismissal.41
Settlements commonly covenant not to disclose the existence, terms, or amount
of the resolution.4" Some further attempt to "gag" the parties with respect to the
49
underlying controversy itself. For sufficient consideration, a settling party might
agree not to voluntarily disclose information concerning the historical facts of a
controversy-information that may be relevant to a public hazard or a defendant's
wrongdoing.5" Although some existing sunshine laws cast doubt on the validity of
5
these types of confidentiality agreements, courts will generally enforce them as

47. See Ky. Utils. Co., 927 F.2d at 253 & n.1 (reviewing stipulated dismissal that required
destruction of unfiled discovery); see also Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 385-86 n.398
(discussing agreements to return or destroy discovery after settlement).
48. See, e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926,928 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that parties often
settle "in part anyway, because they do not want the terms of the resolution to be made public"); EEOC
v. Rush Prudential Health Plans, No. 97-C 3823, 1998 WL 156718 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1998)
(discussing whether confidential settlement precluded disclosure of settlement amount).
49. See Michael D. Moberly, The Discoverability of Severance Agreements in Wrongful
DischargeLitigation, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 11 (2002) (discussing severance and other
settlement agreements that forbid disclosure of "even nonconfidential, truthful information" relating
to the underlying facts (quoting Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lee, 28 P.3d 413, 419-20 (Kan. Ct. App.

2001))).

50. See, e.g., Fomby-Denson v. Dep't of Army, 247 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (refusing to
enforce settlement agreement that prohibited Army from making criminal referrals of federal
employee's conduct); In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1138 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (holding that confidentiality agreements did not preclude former employees from disclosing
nonprivileged information regarding defendant's wrongdoing); Channelmark Corp. v. Destination
Prods. Int'l, Inc., No. 99-C 214, 2000 WL 968818, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2000) (discussing
confidential settlement that "would allow a defendant to continue a pattern of harmful behavior while
being shielded from the legal system" (citing Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Nev.
1993))).
51. The Florida statute, for example, voids as against public policy "[a]ny portion of an
agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of concealing" either a "public hazard" or a
government settlement. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(4), (8)(a) (West Supp. 2004). See also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-55-122 (Michie Supp. 2003) (voiding settlements that restrict disclosure concerning the
"existence or harmfulness of an environmental hazard"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611 (West
Supp. 2004) (permitting court to void private settlements of product liability or hazardous substance
claims).
In addition, an increasing number of commentators question the enforceability of confidentiality
provisions that "gag" settling parties in this manner. See Connolly, supra note 45, § 13.2.8
(characterizing enforcement of such confidentiality provisions as "problematic" when they "seek to
conceal information affecting public health or welfare"); David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret
Settlements and PracticeRestrictionsAid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1217, 1217 (arguing "that the use of secrecy agreements and practice restrictions in settlement
contracts should be prohibited" by ethics rules and criminal and civil law); John P. Freeman, The Ethics
of Using Judges to Conceal Wrongdoing, 55 S.C. L. REv. 829, 832 (2004) (contending that sale of
silence constitutes illegal "compounding" agreement); Alan E. Garfield, PromisesofSilence: Contract
Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 275-76 (1998) (criticizing inadequacy of
existing law regulating confidential settlements that restrict public disclosure of important information);
Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settlement Agreements Conditionedon NoncooperationAre Illegal
and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2002) (arguing that noncooperation clauses that prevent
the voluntary disclosure of "information of civil or criminal wrongdoing to the government or other
persons with a claim" violate federal obstruction of justice laws and rules of professional
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long as they merely restrict voluntary disclosure and do not otherwise prohibit
disclosures required by law or court order.52
In most cases, then, confidentiality does not depend upon judicial involvement
or approval. Many settlements are reached without any judicial participation in
their negotiation or court approval of their terms. In such cases, confidentiality, like
other settlement terms, becomes purely a matter of private agreement to be
enforced, like other contracts, through separate suit for breach.53 The settlement
itself need not be filed with the court, and the litigants can consummate their
compromise simply by filing a stipulation of dismissal with the court.5 4 In such
cases, the court exercises no judicial discretion and cannot, unless requested,

condition the parties' agreement, order the filing of their settlement, or mandate the
public disclosure of its terms." Such confidential settlements, standing alone, do not
implicate any right of public access because no court action has been taken and no
judicial record exists.56
responsibility); Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery
Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 793 (2002) (contending that
secrecy deals "should be treated as legally void, i.e., unenforceable, and in some cases... classified
as criminal").
52. See Connolly, supra note 45, § 13.4.2(b) (noting that while some confidentiality agreements
arguably offend public policy, "this view has met with little support in decided case law"); Koniak,
supranote 51, at 786-87 (recognizing that few states "explicitly prohibit or restrictprivate agreements
... to keep discovery material or the details of a settlement secret").
A settlement risks violating public policy if it does not except court-ordered or legally-compelled
disclosures from its nondisclosure requirements. See Fomby-Denson, 247 F.3d at 1378 (holding
settlement that prohibited Army from making criminal referrals of federal employee's conduct
unenforceable as matter of public policy); Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 367 (refusing to enforce
contractual penalties regarding compelled disclosures).
53. See Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that
a "settlement agreement is a contract" whose breach mayjustify damages in separate action); Jessup,
277 F.3d at 929 (noting that with stipulated dismissal, "settlement is just another contract to be
enforced in the usual way, that is, by a fresh suit"); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772,
788-89 (3d Cir. 1994) (commenting that litigants can always privately contract for confidentiality and
sue to enforce provision in separate contract action).
54. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) provides that "an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of the court.., by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1)(ii). See also Jessup, 277 F.3d at 928 (indicating that
Rule 41 stipulation results in dismissal "without further ado or court action"); Smith v. Phillips, 881
F.2d 902, 905 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that court has "no role to play in the settlement" of a case
dismissed by stipulation).
55. See Smith, 881 F.2d at 904-05 (holding that court lacked postdismissal authority to order
litigants to disclose publicly terms of settlement); Daimes v. Harrison, 838 F. Supp. 1406, 1409 (D.
Colo. 1993) (refusing to order disclosure of unfiled settlement in case dismissed by stipulation).
56. See Jessup, 277 F.3d at 928 (noting that unfiled settlements, even if reached after
commencement of suit, do not require "balancing the interest in promoting settlements... against the
interest in making public materials upon which judicial decisions are based"); Smithldine Beecham
Corp. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (observing that settlement
"that merely motivates the dismissal of a suit is not a judicial order"); see also Judith Resnik, Whose
Judgment? VacatingJudgments,PreferencesforSettlement, and the Role ofAdjudication at the Close
of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471, 1495 (1994) (recognizing that third party cannot
access settlement not filed with or approved by the court). But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(b)
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B. Justificationsfor JudicialInvolvement in ConfidentialSettlements
Litigants frequently are not content to rely solely upon private agreement to

assure confidentiality and may additionally request judicial involvement in, or
approval of, their settlement.57 The injunctive nature of discovery protective orders
may necessitate court approval of any agreement to maintain the nondisclosure or
"return or destruction" provisions of an agreed umbrella order entered during
58
Likewise, any compromise conditioned on the
discovery in the settled case.

sealing, or continued seal, of confidential documents filed with the court would
similarly require judicial endorsement."

In addition, settling parties may forgo an unconditioned stipulated dismissal if
they foresee a need for subsequent judicial oversight of their settlement or
interpretation of its terms.60 Instituting an independent enforcement action to
remedy postsettlement unauthorized disclosures may entail inconvenient delay,
unwanted expense, and, absent an independent basis for federal subject matter
6
jurisdiction, an undesirable state court forum. ' If the parties want the federal court
that presided over their settled dispute to possess postdismissal jurisdiction to
enforce its terms, they must request that the court expressly retain enforcement
62
jurisdiction or embody the confidentiality provision in its order of dismissal.
(designating certain settlement agreements "not filed of record" as "court records" subject to
presumptive right of access).
57. See Geller v. Branic Int'l Realty Corp., 212 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that "[i]n
many cases, a stipulated settlement will contemplate actions that are not within the power of the
litigants to perform, but rather lie within the power of the district court ordering the settlement"):
58. A court retains the power to modify or lift its protective or confidentiality orders at any time,
even after judgment or settlement. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 784-85 (noting court's power to modify or
lift confidentiality orders); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993)
(recognizing court's "inherent power ... to relax or terminate the order, even afterjudgment"); United
Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing court's postdismissal authority to modify); see also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 21.432, at 69, 72 (3d ed. 1995) (describing stipulated protective order as always subject
to modification or termination, even after judgment or settlement).
59. See, e.g., Geller, 212 F.3d at 737 (discussing court's endorsement of settlement conditioned
on sealing entire record); Carty v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 203 F.R.D. 229, 230 (D.V.I. 2001)
(indicating that party has "no authority to 'self-seal' a document absent court order" even when
stipulated).
60. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339,
344 (3d Cir. 1986) (suggesting these as reasons to file settlement). See also FJCReport, supra note
12, at 5-6 (noting that "[s]ealed settlement agreements appear to be filed typically to facilitate their
enforcement" by same judge through contempt powers).
61. See Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634,638 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that suits
to enforce oral contracts are governed by state law and must occur in state court unless diversity
jurisdiction is satisfied); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788-89 (recognizing that commencement of new suit is
"more arduous" than enforcement of court order).
62. In Kokkonen v. GuardianLife Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 511 U.S. 375 (1994), the Supreme Court
indicated that a federal court must embody a "settlement contract in its dismissal order (or, what has
the same effect, retain jurisdiction over the settlement contract)" in order to retain postdismissal
enforcementjurisdiction. Id. at 381-82. Otherwise, absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction,
"enforcement of the settlement agreement is for state courts." Id. at 382. See generally Margaret
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Parties may move a court to issue a confidentiality order for nonjurisdictional
reasons as well. Contractual penalties for breach of a confidentiality pledge,
whether in the form of attorneys' fees, costs, or liquidated damages, 63 might not
prove as effective a deterrent as the Damoclean sword of contempt associated with
violation of a court order.64 The parties can enhance the likelihood of future
compliance by converting their private confidentiality agreement into a court order
enforceable on pain of contempt.65

Moreover, a private confidentiality agreement merely bars voluntary disclosure
by the parties to the settlement.66 It will not bind nonparties 67 and does not create

any evidentiary privilege. 6' A privacy promise thus might not justify withholding
confidential information in the face of a Freedom of Information Act request or a
court discovery order in collateral proceedings. 69 A confidentiality order
concerning settlement-related information mitigates both these dangers. Freedom
of information statutes generally do not apply to the courts, and confidentiality
orders issued in suits when the government is a party may trump the otherwise

Meriwether Cordray, Settlement Agreements and the Supreme Court, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1996)
(discussing Kokkonen); Morton Denlow, Federal Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement
Agreements: Kokkonen Revisited, 2003 FED. CTS. L. REv. 2 (discussing trial court retention of
jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreements); Jeffrey A. Pamess & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing
Settlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REv. 33 (2003) (exploring unsettled questions
remaining after Kokkonen).
63. Harm caused by an unauthorized disclosure might be speculative and not susceptible of ready
proof. See Garfield, supra note 51, at 289, 323 (noting that contract remedies are "ill-suited" for
remedying wrongful disclosures). Stipulated damages clauses aim to avoid prolonged litigation
concerning these damages. They may prove unenforceable, however, if they do not reasonably estimate
the prospective damages from breach of a confidential settlement. See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent,supra
note 4, at 336 n.218, 386 n.401 and accompanying text (discussing stipulated damages clauses in
confidentiality agreements); Garfield, supra note 51, at 292 (suggesting that courts refuse to enforce
stipulated damages provisions in some contracts of silence).
64. See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788-89 (recognizing that separate enforcement action is "more
arduous" than reliance on "court's contempt power to enforce a court order of confidentiality"); City
of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, J., concurring) (noting that court order
serves as a "powerful means of maintaining and enforcing secrecy"); Smith v. Phillips, 881 F.2d 902,
905 (10th Cir. 1989) (indicating that, in absence ofconfidentiality order, unauthorized disclosures can
only be remedied by separate suit).
65. See Connolly, supra note 45, § 13.4.3(d) (suggesting that litigants seek "court imprimatur
upon settlements for the purpose of strengthening enforcement or deterring breach of the agreements").
66. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Newman & Holtzinger, P.C., 992 F.2d 932,936-37 (9th Cir.
1993) (comparing violation of confidentiality agreement, which merely makes parties directly liable
to each other, with violation of court order, which makes breaching party liable to the court for
sanctions).
67. See Wayne D. Brazil, Protectingthe ConfidentialityofSettlement Negotiations,39 HASTINGS
L.J. 955, 1026 (1988) (cautioning that nonparties might need access to "all the evidence that will help
the jury ascertain the truth").
68. In contrast, communications made in furtherance of settlement negotiations (as opposed to
settlement agreements that result from those negotiations) may be privileged and thus immune from
subsequent third-party discovery. See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
69. See Dord, Secrecy by Consent,supra note 4, at 387-88.
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70
statutorily required disclosure of "agency" records. Further, as a matter of comity,
a sister court could recognize the confidentiality order in collateral litigation and
accordingly shield protected information from the prying eyes of similarly situated
7
litigants and other third parties.
Finally, parties to a lawsuit might file or seek court approval of their settlement
even if they do not contemplate the court's retention of enforcement jurisdiction or
issuance of a confidentiality order. As recognized by Judge Posner:

[L]itgants may negotiate with more confidence if they know that
a neutral third party, namely the judge presiding over their case,
will look over the settlement agreement and note any ambiguities
or other flaws in it that might frustrate or complicate its
enforcement should the parties ever come to blows over its
meaning. The judge's participation, though informal, may be
helpful; it is not improper merely because it gives rise to no
72
enforceable rights or duties.
Thus, litigants frequently seek to involve the courts in their confidential
settlements for diverse reasons and in myriad ways. Whether to issue or continue
73
a stipulated protective or sealing order, to retain enforcement oversight, to embody
nondisclosure provisions in a court order, or simply to promote settlement through
judicial hand-holding, courts are being asked to facilitate secret accords in ways
beyond the mere sealing of settlement agreements themselves. A blanket ban like
the local South Carolina federal rule does not address these other, arguably more

70. A judicial secrecy order may permit a federal agency to withhold information or documents
that it would otherwise have to disclose under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2000). See GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 387

(1980). Cf Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 784 n.13 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that

information restricted by a confidentiality order is not a public record for purposes of state "right to
know" act). See generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 318 n.141, 370 n.347 and
accompanying text (discussing impact of government litigant or freedom of information law upon good
cause analysis); Janice Toran, Secrecy Ordersand Government Litigants: "A Northwest Passage
Around the Freedom of Information Act"?, 27 GA. L. REv. 121 (1992) (evaluating intersection of
confidentiality orders and freedom of information laws).
71. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not mandate recognition of a confidentiality order by
other courts, and such an order cannot bind persons who were not party to the proceedings in which it
Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235-36 (1998). See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent,
was entered. Baker v.
supra note 4, at 365 n.330 (discussing the political and logistical difficulties that arise when
confidentiality orders are presented for recognition and enforcement in other courts).
72. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002).

73. A federal court can exercise discretion when deciding whether to initially retain enforcement
jurisdiction, to employ discretion when enforcement is sought, or to subsequently terminatejurisdiction.
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994); Arata v. Nu Skin Int'l, Inc.,
96 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Parness & Walker, supra note 62, at 40-44
(discussing discretionary retention or refusal of settlement enforcement jurisdiction).
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significant, requests for judicial assistance.74
IV. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF CONFIDENTIAL SETrLEMENTS

The South Carolina courts' recent sunshine amendments grow out of a broader
concern with what many perceive as an escalating incidence of routine judicial
endorsement of stipulated secrecy orders. As noted by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals:
Disturbingly, some courts routinely sign orders which contain
confidentiality clauses without considering the propriety of such
orders, or the countervailing public interests which are sacrificed
by the orders.
Because defendants request orders of
confidentiality as a condition of settlement, courts are willing to
grant these requests in an effort to facilitate settlement without
sufficiently inquiring into the potential public interest in obtaining
information concerning the settlement agreement."
In dispensing with any meaningful determination of good cause, such courts
abdicate their responsibility over court records and permit the parties to control
access based on self-interest rather than public interest.76 At the same time, a
blanket bar on the sealing of settlement agreements abdicates judicial responsibility
to exercise discretion to determine whether good cause supports the confidentiality
request. This section addresses the public and private considerations relevant to
good cause and suggests a functional approach that might guide a court in
exercising its discretion concerning confidential settlements.
A.

"Good Cause"

As with protective orders governing discovery, courts must determine that
"good cause" justifies entry of any confidentiality order concerning a settlement.
As stated by the Pansy court:
Protective orders and orders of confidentiality are functionally
similar, and require similar balancing between public and private
74. See Geller v. Branic Int'l Realty Corp., 212 F.3d 734, 737-38 (2d Cir. 2000) (cautioning

courts to "carefully scrutinize the terms of a stipulated confidentiality order before endorsing it").
75. Pansy,23 F.3d at 785-86 (citation omitted).
76. See Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999)
(warning against "rubber stamp[ing]" party agreements and delegating "carte blanche" decisions to seal
record); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (criticizing trial
court for abdicating "responsibility to oversee the discovery process and to determine whether filings
should be made available to the public" and for permitting "parties to control public access to court
papers").
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concerns. We therefore... conclude that whether an order of
confidentiality is granted at the discovery stage or any other stage
of litigation, including settlement, good cause must be
demonstrated to justify the order."
Although the level of good cause necessary to support such an order might vary
depending on the type of order and the nature of the information for which
protection is sought,7" similar private and public considerations factor into the good
cause calculus.
1. Promotion of Settlement
The need to promote settlement via confidentiality orders and agreements
figures prominently in the debate concerning court secrecy, in general, and the new
79
South Carolina antisecrecy rules, in particular. A strong and deeply held public
policy favoring the private settlement of disputes pervades our civil justice system,
which carries as its mantra, the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."8 Not surprisingly, litigants religiously intone this policy when they
contend that their settlement will collapse unless the court accords it some level of
confidentiality. Absent some judicial assurance of privacy, they urge, defendants
will hesitate to settle high profile nuisance suits that would otherwise be tried to
take-nothing judgments. More importantly, repeat players might be unwilling to
settle for fear of establishing a benchmark that would encourage other would-be
8
plaintiffs to sue and that could be used against them in future, related litigation.
In short, the argument goes, restricting secrecy orders will chill settlements and
contribute to an escalating judicial backlog.
Faced with such dire predictions, an over-worked trial judge may be tempted
to find the prospect of settling a case on her over-crowded docket "good cause" in
itself to issue a confidentiality order. A mere generalized interest in promoting
settlement, however, does not, standing alone, justify judicial endorsement of the
parties' confidentiality agreement. Instead, litigants should be required to make "a
82
particularized showing of the need for confidentiality in reaching a settlement."
Moreover, even a particularized interest in encouraging settlement, while a
77. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
78. See infra Part IV.B.
79. See Rooks, supra note 25, at 20 (describing "chilled settlements" as one of the principal

arguments against the South Carolina amendments).

80. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. For a discussion of how our civil justice system actively encourages
settlement from the inception of a lawsuit through its appeal, see Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supranote

4, at 290-92 & nn.19-31.
81. See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that "[d]efendants in
sue").
particular are reluctant to disclose the terms of settlement lest those terms encourage others to
favoring
policy
public
how
(discussing
304
at
4,
note
supra
Consent,
by
Secrecy
Dor6,
See generally
settlement supports the argument of confidentiality proponents).
82. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 788.
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legitimate factor in the good cause formula, must be assessed in light of the
litigants' need for secrecy concerning specific information or documents and the
countervailing interest of the public in obtaining access to those materials.8 3
2.

The Need for Confidentialityand Harmfrom Disclosure

Demonstrating good cause requires a particularized showing of the need for
confidentiality and the harm that might result from disclosure of the settlement or
settlement-related information. In this regard, generalized and unsubstantiated
allegations should not suffice. Instead, good cause requires "a showing that
disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious injury" to a cognizable personal

or proprietary interest.84

A trial court possesses extensive latitude to grant a confidentiality order to
prevent disclosure of a wide array of information and to protect against "annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." 85 Personal privacy, in
particular, deserves heightened protection in today's world of identity theft and
reality television.86 Courts thus might properly find a "compelling interest in
secrecy"" concerning intimate personal information, individual financial data,88 or
the privacy of minors.8 9
For commercial litigants, nonmonetizable claims of embarrassment or damaged

83. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (indicating that if court
finds particularized harm from disclosure, it must balance public and private interests to determine
necessity for protective order).
84. Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210-11; Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (quoting Publicker Indus., Inc. v.
Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984)); see also Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 297 F.3d 544,
548 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying unsubstantiated and nonspecific request to seal appellate record).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Phillips,307 F.3d at 1211-12 (discussing substantial latitude
courts possess in granting protective order governing discovery); Baxter, 297 F.3d at 547 (recognizing
that "[t]rade secret law does not exhaust legitimate interests in confidentiality"); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787
(suggesting that protection of private information may hinge on whether it is sought for legitimate or
illegitimate purpose).
86. Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 94-95 (insisting that privacy of involuntary defendants and
witnesses with no stake in controversy is "valuable in and of itself"). The advent of electronic filing
arguably increases the need to protect legitimate privacy interests. See George F. Carpinello, Public
Access to Court Records in New York: The Experience Under Uniform Rule 216.1 and the Rule's
Future in a World of ElectronicFiling,66 ALB. L. REv. 1089, 1123 (2003).
87. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002).
88. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 190 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding countervailing privacy interest in personal financial information).
89. See Jessup, 277 F.3d at 928. The new South Carolina state court rule recognizes the special
privacy concerns triggered in family court matters. Rule 41.1(b) provides that "[iun family court
matters, the judge shall also consider whether documents: 1) contain material which may expose
private financial matters which could adversely affect the parties; and/or 2) relate to sensitive custody
issues, and shall specifically balance the special interests of the child or children involved .... " S.C.
R. Civ. P. 41.1 (b). See generallyMelissa F. Brown, Family CourtFiles: A Treasure TroveforIdentity
Thieves?, 55 S.C. L. REv. 777 (2004).
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corporate reputation do not furnish good cause."' A court should not, however,
automatically refuse to issue a confidentiality or sealing order simply because
business or commercial interests are at stake. Indeed, "trade secret[s] or other
confidential research, development, or commercial information" can furnish
compelling justification for a confidentiality order, especially if the unauthorized
disclosure of the information would harm a commercial party's competitive or
financial position.9
Confidential settlements may seek to guard against disclosure of similar
personal, proprietary, or commercial information."2 A court should not shy away
from safeguarding such interests, if sufficiently important and supported, simply
because it wishes to keep its hands clean of any taint of "judicial secrecy."
3.

Public Interest in Disclosure

Even if a court finds that a settlement depends upon confidentiality and that
particularized harm will result from its disclosure, the court must still balance the
litigants' private interest in secrecy against any countervailing public interest in
access. Only a small subset of disputes, such as class actions,93 certain antitrust

claims,94 shareholder derivative suits, 95 and those involving minors,96 require court
review and approval of their settlement. These cases are of particular public interest
because they affect persons absent from the bargaining table, as well as the publicat-large. In evaluating these settlements, then, the judge plays a role beyond

90. See Baxter, 297 F.3d at 547 (rejecting "bald assertion that confidentiality promotes
[litigants'] business interests" without explanation as to how disclosure would harm competitive
position); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding
"litigants' interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest" insufficient to justify
seal); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 787 (recognizing difficulty that corporate litigants face in establishing nonmonetizable embarrassment).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). Marketing plans, revenue and pricing information, and similar
confidential research and development materials, for example, may justify judicial protection.
Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 184 F.R.D. 504,506 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). See Dor6, Secrecy
by Consent, supra note 4, at 330-31 nn.190-196 and accompanying text (discussing difficulty
commercial parties encounter in demonstrating harm from disclosure of information that does not
satisfy nebulous definition of "trade secret").
92. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that "courts
have granted protective orders to protect confidential settlement agreements").
93. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1) (requiring that class settlements be "fair, reasonable, and adequate").
94. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (2000) (requiring determination that consent decree is in "public
interest" considering the "competitive impact of such judgment" and its "impact... upon the public
generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations").
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (prohibiting dismissal or compromise of shareholder derivative actions
without notice and court approval).
96. See D.S.C. LOCAL R. 17.02 (prohibiting settlement or dismissal of any "civil action to which
a minor or incompetent person is a party" without court order of approval); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-5-433
(West Supp. 2003) (requiring court approval of settlements with minors that exceed $25,000).
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resolution of the case at hand and serves as guardian of a broader public interest.97
A judge's function in other types of arguably more "private" cases is less clear.
A court's primary purpose is adjudication of the substantive merits of the case
before it.98 Unlike legislative or executive branches of government, courts are not

principally charged with disseminating information for public consumption,
formulating major social policy, or protecting public health or safety. 99
At the same time, courts are not merely a public service for private dispute

resolution."' Litigants can obtain such private justice by opting out of the public
court system in favor of increasingly prevalent-and confidential-alternative
dispute resolution.'0 ' Instead, courts are public institutions, created, staffed, and
heavily subsidized by the broader community. 2 The resolution of at least some
controversies can resonate beyond the immediate parties and the particular court

and affect others, such as similarly situated litigants or other persons who have been

97. See United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1998)
(recognizing court's "'larger role' ... in the resolution through settlement of suits 'affecting the public
interest"' (quoting City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1991)); Janus Films, Inc. v.
Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing court's broaderrole inresolutionof"class actions,
shareholder derivative suits, bankruptcy claims, antitrust suits brought by the United States, and any
suits 'affecting the public interest"'(quoting Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 170 n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(citation omitted)); see also Natalie C. Scott, Note, Don't ForgetMe! The Client in a Class Action
Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGALETHICS 561,578 (2002) (describingjudges as guardians of the best interests
of the class and as responsible to the public).
98. See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Amodeo If') (describing
the determination of litigants' substantive rights as "conduct at the heart ofArticle IlI"judicial powers).
99. See Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 72 (viewing courts as "method for private adjudication"
and "not an arm of the executive branch.. . investigators[, or] attorneys general").
100. See David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J. INST. FOR STUD. LEGAL ETHICS
125, 127 (1999) (contending that courts do not merely provide "system of private justice for dispute
resolution" and do not exist solely "for the private convenience of the litigants"); Weinstein &
Wimberly, supra note 42, at 25 (arguing that judges are not merely neutral arbiters resolving private
disputes).
101. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab, 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that closed
arbitration presents "a sure path to dispute resolution with complete confidentiality"); Union Oil Co.
v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567-68 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[p]eople who want secrecy should opt
for arbitration"); see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge RobertA. Ainsworth, Jr.MemorialLecture,
Loyola UniversitySchool of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405,
1415 (2002) (stating that "marker of arbitration is 'privacy"'); Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 42,
at 20, 25 n. 102 (indicating that public interest is "more readily ignored" in arbitration when public is
"shut out of information almost completely").
102. As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Union Oil:
When [litigants] call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with
subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials.
Judicial proceedings are public rather than private property, and the third-party
effects that justify the subsidy of the judicial system also justify making records
and decisions as open as possible.
Union Oil Co., 220 F.3d at 568 (citations omitted); see also Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that "public at large pays for the courts and therefore
has an interest in what goes on at all stages of a judicial proceeding"); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical
Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 513 (1994) (asserting that the "public,
which created and funds our judicial institutions, depends upon those institutions to protect it").
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or will be affected by the activities or conduct at issue. °3 As illustrated by the most
recent secrecy scandals, nonparties and the general public possess an interest in
some cases that may outweigh the parties' desire to settle them confidentially-at
least with judicial assistance. The difficulty lies in distinguishing cases that
implicate such a legitimate public interest from those in which access merely
satiates idle curiosity or voyeurism."'
a.

Government Litigants

Case law and antisecrecy rules consistently recognize one class of case in which
the public arguably has a significant, legitimate public interest-those involving a
public official or governmental entity, or otherwise bearing on the administration
of public office or the functioning of government."0 Unlike private litigants,
government litigants "represent and serve a public constituency, even in
litigation."'' "° Besides facilitating public monitoring of the judiciary," 7 access to
these cases educates the public about the government itself and the specific
governmental action in controversy. is With settlement in particular, the public
possesses a fundamental interest in supervising the use and expenditure of public

103. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ": JudicialPromotionand Regulation
ofSettlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1379 (1994) (asserting that focus in settlement should shift from
"results among the parties (and the forum) to consider the effects a given process has on others").
104. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
DemocraticDefense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEo. L.J. 2663, 2667 n.24 (1995) (noting
difficulty of identifying cases of legitimate public interest); Marcus, supra note 43, at 469 (noting thin
line between "public law" and "private law" cases); Miller, supranote 43, at 467 (criticizing sunshine
reform as feeding public interests of curiosity and voyeurism). The FJC study concerning sealed
settlements indicates that approximately two-fifths ofthe cases found with sealed settlement agreements
had at least one feature "that might make them of special public interest." FJCReport,supra note 12,
at 8.
105. The new South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure, for instance, provides that "[u]nder no
circumstances shall a court approve sealing a settlement agreement which involves a public body or
institution." S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1(c). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-18-401 (Michie Supp. 2002)
(prohibiting governmental agency from agreeing to confidential settlement or seeking secrecy order
concerning settlement terms); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.3 (2003) (restricting agencies of government
or its subdivisions from entering into confidential settlements without "overriding interest"); OR. REv.
STAT. § 30.402 (2001) (prohibiting public body from entering into confidential settlement); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 76a (creating presumption of public access to settlement agreements that "have a probable
adverse effect upon ... the administration of public office, or the operation of government"). See
generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 369-70, 397-98 (discussing the public interest
in cases and settlements involving the government).
106. Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 369.
107. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale for open
courts.
108. See, e.g., Charlie H. v. Whitman, 213 F.R.D. 240, 251-52 (D.N.J. 2003) (recognizing great
public importance of case involving child welfare system and need for "letting in some reasonable
sunlight on the way government works"); Doe v. Marsalis, 202 F.R.D. 233, 239 (N.D. 11. 2001)
(permitting postsettlement access to discovery in police sexual misconduct case because "[p]olice
misconduct" is matter of "general concern to the workings of our democratic society").
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funds.0 9 Thus, public litigants "stand in a different light" than private parties with
respect to access"' and courts "should favor revelation and openness with respect
to government and other institutional activity."'I
Relatedly, settlements may be of potential public interest if the confidential
information would otherwise be subject to disclosure under an applicable freedom
of information act." 2 Such legislation aims to facilitate public monitoring and
government accountability. As previously discussed, a confidentiality or sealing
order can contravene the purpose of these laws by permitting the bound
governmental litigant to escape statutory disclosure obligations. To prevent such
frustration of legislative intent, a court can narrowly draw-or refuse
altogether-any type of order that impedes public access to settlements or
settlement-related information otherwise subject to disclosure under federal or state
3
"right to know" provisions. '
b. Public Health and Safety
Another common target of many antisecrecy rules concerns information
relevant to public health and safety.' " This consideration raises both pragmatic and
theoretical difficulties. As a pragmatic matter, before refusing the parties'

109. See Daines v. Harrison, 838 F. Supp. 1406, 1408-09 (D. Colo. 1993) (stating that neither

desire to hide bad behavior nor the interest in promoting settlement outweighs the "public['s]

...

interest in seeing that public funds are utilized properly").
110. Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 73-74, 98.
111. Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 42, at 30-31; see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg,
23 F.3d 772, 785-86 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing public interest "as particularly legitimate and
important" where at least one party is a public entity or official); Tower v. Leslie-Brown, 167 F. Supp.
2d 399,404 (D. Me. 2001) (stating that presumption of access "accumulates... more weight when the
government... is accused of wrongdoing").
112. See, e.g., Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2002) (addressing newspaper's
attempt to access settlement involving public college through state's freedom of information act); Ford
v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 241-42 (5th Cir. 2001) (vacating confidentiality order concerning
settlement between city and employee because trial court failed to consider effect of that order on
disclosure under Texas Public Information Act); Pansy, 23 F.3d at 791 (discussing impact of sealing
order on newspaper's effort to obtain civil rights settlement with borough and its officials under
Pennsylvania's Right to Know Act).
113. In discussing this factor, the Third Circuit in Pansy stated that "[n]either the interests of
parties in settling cases, nor the interests of the federal courts in cleaning their dockets, can be said to
outweigh the important values manifested by freedom of information laws." Pansy, 23 F.3d at 792.
Accordingly, "a strong presumption [exists] against entering or maintaining" a secrecy order in such
cases. Id.
114. See, e.g.. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (Michie Supp. 2003) (voiding settlement agreement
or provision concealing environmental hazard); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West Supp. 2004)
(prohibiting concealment ofpublic hazards); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426(C)-(E) (West Supp.
2003) (prohibiting protective order regarding discovery or sealing of records if information relates to
public hazard); TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (creating presumption ofpublic access to "court records" that "have
a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety .. ");WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.61 1(4)(b) (West Supp. 2004) (restricting confidentiality provisions in court order or private
agreement that involve product liability or hazardous substance claims).
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confidentiality request on this ground, a court must determine that a safety risk
exists, an inquiry arguably reaching the merits of the controversy. Whether a court

possesses sufficient information to make this assessment when presented with a
settlement depends, among other things, on the maturity of the litigation and the
amount of discovery that has been produced, filed, or otherwise made known to the
court. The effort, time, and cost involved in making additional investigation into
this issue may well undercut the very benefits that settlement is meant to offer."'
Likewise, "uncertainties as to what is and what is not a danger to public health
or safety" further complicate the inquiry." 6 Some types of cases obviously
implicate public health, welfare, and safety concerns more than others. Product
liability litigation alleging a design defect in a standard product that is marketed on
a national or international scale-like that involved in the Firestone tire
litigation-presents one such example.H7 Environmental hazards that affect broader
communities"' or fraudulent securities and financial schemes that potentially harm
whole markets illustrate others." 9 A court's approval or sealing of a confidential
settlement in such cases may deny similarly situated plaintiffs, potential victims,
regulatory authorities, or the media timely access to information regarding a
continuing hazard. 2 '

Courts can take some comfort in the fact that they are generally not the first line

115. As noted by Professor Friedenthal:
To do its job properly, the court would have to hear from experts and other
witnesses. Much of the value of the settlement would be lost, and the cost in time
and energy of the court as well as the parties could be substantial. There would
be an enormous burden on the judicial system if extensive inquiry were required
of courts any time a confidentiality agreement was presented for approval.
Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 91.
116. Id. at90.
117. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206,1209-10 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
access to settlement information in case involving pickup fuel-fed fires); Chicago Tribune Co. v.
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,1315 (11 th Cir. 2001) (indicating that interest in preserving
trade secrets must still be balanced against "public's legitimate interest in health and safety").
118. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562,567 (7th Cir. 2000) (reversing sealing of
file in settlement of environmental case); Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2000)
(addressing impropriety of sealing confidential settlement in environmental tort lawsuit brought by
residents of a trailer park whose drinking water had been contaminated by defendant's underground
wells); United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 858 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing
"great public importance" of CERCLA suit involving contamination of town water supply).
119. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(discussing confidentiality agreement in securities fraud class action).
120. See Bonanti, supra note 1, at 53 (arguing that Firestone settlements concealed information
regarding dangerous product from consumers, media, and government regulators); Gillers, supranote
51, at 22 (asserting that nondisclosure agreements keep information regarding "financial frauds,
dangerous products, or dangerous people" from others who have been or will be harmed); Weinstein
& Wimberly, supra note 42, at 21-22 (asserting that judge must weigh interests of other litigants,
regulatory agencies, future plaintiffs, and public interest groups); Richard Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep
Secrets About PublicHarm, PROF. LAW. Summer 2001, at 1 (arguing that secret settlements conceal
information from the public regarding known harms).
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of defense against these potential public dangers.' 2 ' Presumably, the legislative and
executive branches of government have greater expertise and primary prophylactic
responsibility in this area. 22 Ultimately, the question of whether a settlement
triggers a legitimate public interest in access will depend on case specifics and the
court's assessment of the public's need to know.123
4. Similarly SituatedLitigants
The anonymous "general public" may well possess rights too amorphous to
identify, let alone protect. The pendency of related litigation involving one or more
of the parties, however, may indicate that a narrower class of nonparties possesses
a more particularized and weightier interest in access to information generated in
the settled case.' 24 Indeed, one of the most compelling reasons to modify a
discovery protective order, even after a case has been long-settled and dismissed,
is to permit the sharing of the otherwise protected discovery with collateral litigants
in other sufficiently related pending cases.' 25 Such evidence-sharing avoids the
needless duplication of discovery that would otherwise occur in the related lawsuit,
126
resulting in an overall savings of time and expense.
The mere existence of collateral litigation, however, should not altogether
preclude judicial involvement in confidential settlements. Instead, a court can
foresee and account for the prospect of similarly situated litigants by carefully

121. Some would contend, however, that courts are the last resort after the executive and
legislative branches of government have failed to identify and prevent public hazards. See Weinstein
& Wimberly, supra note 42, at 21-22 (noting the frequent inadequacy of government regulatory
systems); Harvey Weitz, Symposium Comment, 9 J.L. POL'Y 103, 106 (2000) (contending that open
courts play a "vital role" in assisting government regulatory agencies to ensure public safety).
122. See Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 89 (attributing safety failures to "governmental agencies
who knew of the dangers and the members of the media who did not adequately publicize the
information available to them").
123. See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the "interest in secrecy
is weighed against the competing interests case by case").
124. Besides seeking access to unfiled discovery covered by a protective order in a settled case,
similarly situated litigants can request disclosure ofdiscovery, motions, and otherjudicial records filed
under seal as part of the settlement. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122,
1136-37 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing collateral litigants' effort to unseal eighty-five documents,
including discovery and motions for summaryjudgment, that had been filedunder seal in settled case).
125. In Foltz, the Ninth Circuit recently reaffirmed that it "strongly favors access to discovery
materials to meet the needs of parties engaged in collateral litigation." 331 F.3d at 1131-32. It then
clarified when and how collateral litigants may obtain discovery materials produced under a blanket
protective order in the settled case. Id. at 1132-34. See generallyDor6,Secrecy by Consent, supra note
4, at 363-68 (discussing the considerations that guide courts in determining whether to modify a
stipulated discovery order to permit evidence-sharing in related litigation).
126. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1131-32 ("Allowing the fruits of one litigation to facilitate preparation
in other cases advances the interests of judicial economy by avoiding the wasteful duplication of
discovery.").
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crafting its secrecy order.'2 7 "Fishing expeditions" by current or prospective
litigants should be rebuffed if the need for confidentiality in the settled case remains
Collateral
strong, while the need for access in the collateral case is weak.'
litigants who wish to penetrate a confidentiality order should be required 2to9
demonstrate the relevance of and legitimate need for the protected information,
as well as an inability to procure similar materials without undue burden or
expense. 3 °

The court thus can veto the settling parties' request to wholly bar evidencesharing with similarly situated litigants and, instead, expressly provide for such
collateral disclosure to eligible litigants. Although this might scuttle some
confidential compromises, the court can protect the privacy interests of the settling
parties by conditioning any evidence-sharing on the collateral litigants' consent to
the nondisclosure provisions of the order and by retaining subsequent enforcement
jurisdiction. '
5.

Settlement Facts versus Adjudicative Facts

As previously discussed, some confidential settlements prohibit the parties from

127. See Tucker v. Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., 191 F.R.D. 495, 499-501 (D. Md. 2000)
(cautioning courts to "avoid issuing discovery orders that are applicable only to collateral litigation in
another court" and that would forever insulate the settling defendant from producing protected
discovery in other actions).
128. See Griffith v. Univ. Hosp., L.L.C., 249 F.3d 658, 663 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying plaintiffs
in related arbitration from obtaining discovery in confidentially settled class action because disclosure
would upset settlement and prejudice rights of class members); SRS Techs., Inc. v. Physitron, Inc., 216
F.R.D. 525, 531 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (denying disclosure of protected discovery in settled case when
defendant's reliance on and need for secrecy outweighed plaintiffs "interest in avoiding duplicative
discovery in a possible future civil case").
129. The relevance ofcollateral disclosure "hinges 'on the degree ofoverlap in facts, parties, and
issues between the suit covered by the protective order and the collateral proceedings."' Foltz, 331 F.3d
at 1132 (quoting Dort, Secrecy by Consent,supra note 4, at 366-67). CompareWalker v. Prudential
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11 th Cir. 2002) (denying collateral litigants access to
irrelevant confidential settlements in other insufficiently similar employment discrimination cases) with
Menasha Corp. v. News America Mktg. In-Store, Inc., No. 00-C 1895, 2002 WL 664067, at *2 (N.D.
11.Apr. 23, 2002) (modifying protective order to permit sharing in virtually identical collateral antitrust
suit), LeBlanc v. Broyhill, 123 F.R.D. 527, 530 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (permitting sharing of discovery in
cases based on "same set of operative facts"), and Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120 F.R.D. 648, 654
(D. Md. 1987) (stating that "[s]haring... may be particularly appropriate where multiple individual
plaintiffs assert essentially the same alleged wrongs against a national manufacturer of a consumer
product").
130. See Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 92-93 (recognizing "substantial merit" of evidencesharing but limiting disclosure to "serious attempts to obtain information that otherwise might not be
available or would be costly and time consuming to duplicate").
131. In Foltz, the Ninth Circuit stressed the need to ensure that "reasonable restrictions on
collateral disclosure will continue to protect an affected party's legitimate interests in privacy ......
331 F.3d at 1131-32. See Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 98 (stressing that the "entire situation,"
including "reasons for confidentiality," should be addressed and proper restrictions imposed before
permitting collateral disclosure).
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voluntarily discussing the settlement itself, its terms or conditions, or the factual and
legal merits of the settled controversy.' 32 Such an agreement calls for a particularly
discriminating exercise of judicial discretion since a valid distinction can (and
probably should) be drawn between settlement facts concerning the specific terms,
amounts, and conditions of a compromise, and adjudicative facts relevant to the
underlying merits of the settled case.'33
The general public seldom possesses a strong interest in obtaining information
regarding the specific terms or amounts of a settlement between nongovernmental,
private litigants. 34 The specific amount paid to resolve a dispute has scant
relevance to public health, welfare, or safety.'35 Its disclosure may invade the
countervailing privacy interests of the settling parties, who frequently have a
peculiar interest in securing, often through the payment of a premium, the
confidentiality of these settlement terms. Not even similarly situated present or
future litigants can lay good claim to such settlement facts.' 36 Although access to
the amounts or terms of a compromise may strategically assist a collateral litigant
to assess the settlement value of his related case, it generally will not advance the
determination of the substantive merits of his claim.' 37 Unlike discovery produced
in the settled case or the historical facts comprising the dispute, settlement

132. See, e.g., McKnight v. Stein Mart, Inc., 1996 WL 481079, at *1 (E.D. La. 1996) (evaluating
nondisclosure provision covering "any and all information relating to any aspect of [plaintiffs]
employment"); Scott v. Nelson, 697 So. 2d 1300, 1300-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (describing
confidentiality agreement that prohibited plaintiff"from responding 'in any way to any inquiry of any
kind whatsoever with regard to the facts surrounding the case/claim"').
133. See Gillers, supranote 51, at 4 (distinguishing between settlement amounts and information
establishing liability); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 104, at 2685 (differentiating "settlement facts"
from adjudicative facts); Weinstein & Wimberly, supranote 42, at 18-19 (distinguishing "documents
that appear to reveal a defendant's wrongful conduct" from "amount and terms of a settlement"); Zitrin,
supra note 120, at 1 (focusing on "information about the claimed harm," rather than settlement
amount).
134. See Weinstein & Wimberly, supra note 42, at 25 (finding no strong reason to oppose
confidentiality of amount and other settlement details, which are "normally a matter ofmuch less public
interest than is evidence of the merits").
135. See Gillers, supra note 51, at 22 (finding no impropriety in a "desire to keep confidential
the amounts paid in settlement"); Koniak, supra note 51, at 791 n.41 (doubting that settlement amounts
"provide much useful information to anyone outside of future litigants and their lawyers").
136. See Cason v. Builders Firstsource-Southeast Group, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 242, 249
(W.D.N.C. 2001) (holding settlement documents between employer and EEOC not discoverable);
Butta-Brinkman v. FCA Int'l, Ltd., 164 F.R.D. 475, 476-77 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (refusing to compel
production of confidential settlement in other sexual harassment suits against settling defendant unless
plaintiff could not otherwise obtain the information); Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D.
Nev. 1993) (requiring collateral litigant to "show a compelling need" tojustify disclosure of specific
settlement terms).
137. See In re New York County Data Entry Worker Prod. Liab. Litig., 616 N.Y.S.2d 424, 426
(Sup. Ct. 1994) (finding that nonsettling defendants' need to obtain terms and consideration of
settlements was "nothing more than trial strategy" and did not arise "out ofmateriality or necessity but,
rather, desirability"); see also Gillers, supra note 51, at 4 (acknowledging that nondisclosure
agreements concerning settlement amounts have potentially "proper purpose" and "generally do not
describe information... establish[ing] ... liability").
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information does not predate or exist independent of the litigation. The settling
parties create and control this settlement information, which would not otherwise
38 Absent demonstrated relevance to collateral
exist but for their compromise.'
39
claims or defenses or some other compelling need for public disclosure, a court
can appropriately promote settlement by safeguarding the confidentiality of its
contents.
In contrast, a court should deny judicial protection to any nondisclosure
40
Although
provision that suppresses evidence potentially relevant to other cases.

a common impetus for settlement, the desire to shield oneself from potential claims
4
should not impede the discovery rights of third parties.' ' Thus, while the parties

themselves may pledge not to voluntarily disclose factual information surrounding
their settled dispute,' 42 their private undertaking should not bind regulatory
43
authorities or nonparties to the agreement.' Certainly, a court should hesitate to
"condone the practice of buy[ing] the silence of a witness with a settlement
agreement"'" or to "seal existing evidence that would ordinarily be accessible to

138. See Koniak, supra note 51, at 803 n.96 (recognizing that settlement information "belong[s]
jointly to both parties in a way that discovery information does not-because it is jointly created by
them (and does not preexist the dispute in any form)").
139. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002) (compelling
production of information regarding total number and aggregate dollar amount of prior settlements as
potentially relevant to punitive damages claim); White v. Kenneth Warren & Son, Ltd., 203 F.R.D. 364,
367 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (requiring production of settlement that was relevant to nonsettling defendant's
potential liability and litigation risks); EEOC v. Rush Prudential Health Plans, No. 97-C 3823, 1998
Mar. 31, 1998) (ordering employer to disclose amount of settlement with
WL 156718, at *5 (N.D. 111.
former employee so that EEOC could decide whether the public interest required further prosecution).
140. See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Secs. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133-34 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that confidentiality agreement signed by former employees did not preclude them from
disclosing nonprivileged information regarding defendant's wrongdoing); Channelmark Corp. v.
Destination Prods. Int'l, Inc., No. 99-C 214, 2000 WL 968818, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2000) (stating
that the "public reaps no benefit by allowing settlement agreements to suppress evidence"); McKnight
v. Stein Mart, Inc., 1996 WL 481079, at * I (E.D. La. 1996) (permitting discovery of underlying factual
information, but protecting contents of negotiations and terms of settlement agreement).
141. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
no entitlement to judicial protection from future suits and exposure to additional liability).
142. But see supra note 51 (discussing the arguments against enforcing these types of
nondisclosure agreements). In somejurisdictions, including South Carolina, these settlement provisions
may additionally raise issues ofprofessional ethics. See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm. Op. 93-20 (1993)
(suggesting that a defense lawyer may violate Rule 3.4(0 by requesting that a plaintiff promise to
"withhold relevant information from another party," and that a plaintiffs lawyer may violate Rule
8.4(a) by recommending that his client make the promise). See generally Yvette Golan, Restrictive
Settlement Agreements: A Critique of Model Rule 5.6 (B), 33 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (2003); Heather
Waldbeser and Heather DeGrave, Current Development, A Plaintiff'sLawyer's Dilemman: The Ethics
of Entering a ConfidentialSettlement, 16 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815 (2003).
143. See Channelmark, 2000 WL 968818, at *5 (compelling discovery to prevent settling
defendant from "continu[ing] a pattern of harmful behavior while being shielded from the legal
system").
144. Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 365 (D. Nev. 1993).
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' 45

other litigants."'
B.

The Rationalefor Open Courts

"Good cause" thus entails consideration of potentially infinite case-specific
private and public factors. How is a court to balance these frequently competing
interests and determine whether the need for secrecy outweighs the public interest
in disclosure? As I have argued elsewhere, the rationale for public access to
judicial records and proceedings provides a functional touchstone that can assist
courts in this endeavor. 41 In particular, the purpose of public access can serve as
a valuable compass for courts deciding whether to seal settlements or otherwise
sanction the parties' confidentiality agreement.
Access to judicial records facilitates public monitoring of the judicial system
and enhances public understanding of, and confidence in, the courts.' 4 7 As noted

by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
[P]ublic monitoring is an essential feature of democratic control.
Monitoring both provides judges with critical views of their work
and deters arbitrary judicial behavior. Without monitoring,
moreover, the public could have no confidence in the
conscientiousness, reasonableness, or honesty of judicial
proceedings. Such monitoring is not possible without access to
testimony and documents that are used in the performance of
48
Article III functions.
The level of good cause necessary to sustain a confidentiality or sealing order thus

145. United States v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Arguably, gag orders of this type inflict greater harm than protective orders that prohibit the sharing
of discovery in related cases. In the discovery context, collateral litigants can at least conduct their own
independent discovery to obtain information equivalent to that covered by the protective order. In
contrast, a nondisclosure order that impedes witness testimony may interfere with even this right to
independent discovery.
146. Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 402 (applying this functional touchstone to
discovery protective orders, sealing orders, and confidentiality orders concerning settlements).
147. See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
common law right of access and "public interest in understanding the judicial process" (quoting
Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995))); Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting that "the public cannot monitor judicial performance adequately if the records of
judicial proceedings are secret"); Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 297 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002)
(citing public's need "to know what the heavy financial subsidy of litigation is producing"); Chicago
Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11 th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]he
operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern"
(quoting Landmark Comm. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978))); Columbus-America Disc. Group
v. Atd. Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 291, 303 (4th Cir. 2000) (recognizing necessity of publicity "so that the
public can judge the product of the courts in a given case").
148. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995).
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appropriately varies depending upon the nature of that order, the information it
role that those materials play in the core adjudicative
seeks to protect, and1 4the
9
function of the court.

1. Discovery, JudicialRecords, and Sealing Orders
This functional approach might produce different decisions regarding two
distinct requests that settling parties frequently make of a court: (1) continuation of
the nondisclosure provisions of an agreed protective order covering unfiled
50 Protective and
discovery; and (2) sealing orders governing judicial records.'
sealing orders frequently predate settlement and occur during the pretrial litigation
phase of the dispute. Indeed, courts routinely enter umbrella protective orders at the
inception of the discovery process, and such discovery orders commonly anticipate
and mandate the filing of protected materials under seal. I have elsewhere
addressed the public access issues implicated by these distinct types of secrecy
orders and will not reiterate that extensive discussion here.'' Similar issues and
concerns, however, resurface when litigants condition their confidential settlement
on the court's maintenance of discovery protective orders or the sealing of case
files. As with pre-settlement decisions, the rationale for open courts offers
guidance.
a. Protective Orders Regarding Unfiled Discovery
Public access to unfiled discovery, for instance, does not assist the public in
monitoring or understanding a court's primary adjudicative function. Discovery5 is2
involvement.'
largely a self-regulating process that ideally entails minimal judicial
A significant amount of discovery is never filed with, reviewed by, or relied upon
by the court in its decision-making.5 3 Further, unfiled discovery is never filtered
for reliability or admissibility and much of it may be irrelevant to the claims and
defenses of the parties. In Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, the United States Supreme

149. See Baxter,297 F.3d at 548 (indicating that "strong presumption of public disclosure applies
only to the materials that formed the basis of the parties' dispute and the district court's resolution").

150. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)

(recognizing that discovery documents and court records require different analysis); Baxter, 297 F.3d

at 545 ("Secrecy is fine at the discovery stage, before material enters the judicial record."); Chicago
TribuneCo., 263 F.3d at 1311 (distinguishing between "those items which may properly be considered

public or judicial records and those that may not").
151. See Dort, Secrecy by Consent, supranote 4, at 324-71 (discussing discovery and stipulated
protective orders); id. at 371-83 (discussing sealing of judicial records).

152. See Higginbotham, supranote 101, at 1417 (characterizing discovery as "almost exclusively

conducted as a private matter away from the courthouse"); Zitrin, supra note 120, at 20 (commenting
on vast amount of unfiled discovery handled entirely by lawyers "outside the view of the court").
153. See Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562,568 (7th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that "[m]uch
of what passes between the parties remains out of public sight because discovery materials are not filed
with the court").
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Court described discovery as a historically closed proceeding, the "sole purpose"
of which is "assisting in the preparation and trial, or the settlement, of litigated
disputes."' 54 The "raw fruits" of discovery thus should not trigger any presumption
of public access that may otherwise tip the scales in favor of disclosure.' 55
Although a court must still fred "good cause" for the postsettlement issuance
or continuation of a stipulated discovery protective order,'56 both the strong public
policy favoring settlement and the parties' need for and justifiable reliance upon its
confidentiality provisions rightly factor into that determination. 57 Moreover,
because access to unfiled discovery does not advance public oversight of the
judicial function,'5 8 these private factors may well outweigh any countervailing
public interest in disclosure and support the court's decision to maintain the nondisclosure provisions in an agreed judgment, order of dismissal, or confidentiality
9
order.

5

b.

Sealing ofJudicialRecords

In contrast, a more onerous and particularized showing of good cause should
be required to justify sealing documents, including discovery, that are filed with the
court and utilized in connection with judicial proceedings. 6 ° Anything useful and

154. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34-35 (1984). According to the Supreme
Court, a right of public access hinges on a tradition of accessibility surrounding the particular process
at issue and on whether access will play a significant positive role in the functioning of that process.
See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1,8-9 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982).
155. See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing discovery materials as
"private documents, not judicial records" (citation omitted)); Chicago Tribune Co., 263 F.3d at
1310-11 (finding no common law right of access to unfiled discovery materials, which are "neither
public documents nor judicial records"). But see Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "fruits of pre-trial discovery are, in the absence of a court order to the
contrary, presumptively public").
156. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003)
(remanding for "actual showing of good cause" to continue post settlement protection of unfiled
discovery produced under blanket protective order); Chicago Tribune Co., 263 F.3d at 1313
(remanding for Firestone to show need for confidentiality of discovery filed under seal in settled case).
157. Although settlement obviates the need to expedite discovery via an agreed protective order,
the parties' reliance on the postsettlement maintenance of that order properly factors into the court's
good cause determination. See Miller, supra note 43, at 486 (asserting that if "effectiveness of the
protective order cannot be relied on, its capacity to motivate settlement will be compromised"). See also
Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 360-63 (discussing party reliance as good cause factor).
158. See S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (determining that pretrial
depositions are not judicial records because they "play no role in the performance of Article III
functions" (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995))).
159. See Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 80 (contending that a presumption of confidentiality
should attach to unfiled discovery).
160. See Chicago Tribune Co., 263 F.3d at 1313 (hinging analysis on whether filed discovery
was used forjudicial resolution of merits); Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that "most portions of discovery that are filed and form the basis of judicial action must
eventually be released").
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relevant to a court's decision-making qualifies as a "judicial record" that carries a
6
qualified presumption of public access.' ' Although courts differ concerning the
strength of that rebuttable presumption, it should vary with the role the filed
materials play in the court's decision-making and its determination of the litigant's
substantive rights.'62
Accordingly, courts should critically evaluate settlements conditioned on the
63
If the presumption of public access
sealing of materials filed with the court.'
a court may justifiably deny the
strong,
sufficiently
is
matters
concerning those
if that refusal will derail their
even
order
sealing
litigants' mutual request for a

compromise.'
Requests to indiscriminately seal the whole record are particularly suspect,
6
since the sealing decision requires particularized review. ' Without itemization of
the file contents, a court cannot assess the role that a pleading, exhibit, motion, or

other paper plays in its decision-making.'

Further, the strength of the access

presumption hinges on that determination. For instance, records that are central to

a court's adjudication of a case trigger a strong presumption of public access that
neither party's reliance on a sealing agreement nor its importance in achieving

161. See In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 67 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished opinion),
available at 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 25900, at **4 (holding that a "document becomes a judicial
document when a court uses it in determining litigants' substantive rights," and that "a document must
play a relevant and useful role in the adjudication process ...for the common law right of public access
to attach"); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Amodeo F') (holding that filed
materials "must be relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial
process" to qualify as judicial documents).
162. In Amodeo II, the Second Circuit utilized this sliding scale approach, stating:
We believe that the weight to be given the presumption of access must be
governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article M judicial
power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal
courts. Generally, the information will fall somewhere on a continuum from
matters that directly affect an adjudication to matters that come within a court's
purview solely to insure their irrelevance.
United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995).
163. Because judicial records are presumptively accessible, courts must give interested parties
notice of and an opportunity to object to any motion to seal, consider less drastic alternatives to sealing,
and provide specific reasons and factual findings to support sealing. Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d
288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000); In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231,235-36 (4th Cir. 1984).
164. See Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960 F.2d 1013, 1014, 1016 (11 th Cir. 1992) (finding
it "immaterial" that sealing of entire record was the "key negotiated element[]" of court-facilitated
settlement).
165. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (requiring that
motions to seal appellate record "analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of secrecy,
providing reasons and legal citations"); Chicago Tribune Co., 263 F.3d at 1311 (requiring heightened
scrutiny of decision to seal "record of an entire case, making no distinction between those documents
that are sensitive or privileged and those that are not").
166. See Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994)
(requiring that litigants "itemize for the court's approval which documents have been introduced into
the public domain").
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settlement will likely rebut.'67 By the same token, privileged material may present
a sufficiently compelling reason to seal even a dispositive document that would
ordinarily be presumptively accessible.'
Even when a court finds a significant need for confidentiality, it must adopt the
least restrictive alternative to sealing. 169 If feasible, options narrower than
wholesale closure, such as redaction of private, privileged, or proprietary
information, should be utilized. 170 In short, "the entirety of a trial record can be
7
sealed" only in "extreme cases" that implicate a "compelling interest in secrecy.'1
2.

Sealing Settlements

Whether a settlement agreement itself triggers any presumption ofpublic access
depends upon whether it constitutes a "judicial record."'' 72 As noted by Judge
Posner, private settlement agreements that are never filed with the court,
167. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2003) (indicating
that only "compelling reasons" can rebut presumption of access to sealed material that "adjudicates
substantive rights and serves as a substitute for trial"); Amodeo 17, 71 F.3d at 1049 (attributing strong
presumption to "matters that directly affect an adjudication").
Obviously, then, an extraordinary showing must justify sealing the judicial product itself-the
judge's opinions, orders, and judgments. See Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir.
2000) (stating that "it should go without saying that the judge's opinions and orders belong in the
public domain"); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Lines, 239 F. Supp. 2d 351, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(stating that "[a]t a minimum, the Court's orders and decisions should be available for public review");
see also Friedenthal, supra note 42, at 74 (acknowledging that court decisions, "with few exceptions,
should be open to the public, although they may be written carefully so as not to reveal private
information considered by the court when making its determinations"); Weinstein & Wimberly, supra
note 42, at 29-30 (cautioning courts against withdrawing their opinions, which "assist other courts and
parties").
168.
See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1137-38 (permitting continued seal of attorney-client
communications and work product); The Diversified Group, Inc. v. Daugerdas, 217 F.R.D. 152
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (permitting the sealing of privileged matters contained in successful motion for
summary judgment); Rapkin v. Rocque, 87 F. Supp. 2d 140, 143 (D. Conn. 2000) (finding that public
interest in preserving attorney-client privilege outweighed presumption of access to entire complaint).
169. Most court rules governing the sealing of records, including those in South Carolina, require
the least restrictive alternative to sealing. See D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03(a) (requiring that movant "explain
(for each document or group of documents) why less drastic alternatives to sealing will not afford
adequate protection"); S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1 (b)(6) (requiring that motion to seal address why alternatives
to sealing are insufficient "to protect legitimate private interests").
170. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1137 (finding sealing order overbroad since limited amount ofprivate
information could be easily redacted); Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943,
945 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that even if document contains trade secrets, secrecy interest can be
protected adequately by redaction).
171. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that extreme cases may
concern "trade secrets, the identity of informers, and the privacy of children"); see also Union Oil Co.,
220 F.3d at 567 (noting that "parties' confidentiality agreement can not [sic] require a court to hide a
whole case from view"); Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 16 F.3d 549, 551 (3d Cir. 1994) (describing heavy
burden on party seeking to seal entire record).
172. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that
presumption of access applies only to judicial documents); see generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent,
supra note 4, at 394-95 (discussing the sealing of settlement agreements).
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like most arbitration awards and discovery materials, are private
documents, not judicial records, and so the issue of balancing the
interest in promoting settlements by preserving secrecy against the
interest in making public materials upon which judicial decisions
are based does not arise-there is no judicial decision. Even if the
parties reach settlement after suit has been filed, the settlement
agreement will not be a judicial record, because the parties will
file a stipulation of dismissal pursuant to which the suit will be
dismissed without further ado or court action, and the settlement
agreement that motivated the stipulation of dismissal will then
73
have the identical status as any other private contract.'
Thus, an unfiled settlement does not become a judicial record even if the court
retains enforcement jurisdiction, issues a confidentiality order, or reviews its
74
terms.
As previously discussed, however, litigants sometimes file their confidential
settlement with the court. Presumably, they do so because they seek some type of
court action concerning their agreement-the entry of a consent judgment, the
issuance of a confidentiality order, the retention of enforcement jurisdiction, or
7
merely the review and approval of its terms. 1 Whatever the reason for filing the
instrument, the filing, together with the request for judicial assistance, turns what
would otherwise be a private contract into a record relevant and useful to judicial
decision-making-a judicial record subject to a presumptive right of public
access.

176

Those controversies requiring judicial review of the fairness or reasonableness
of their settlement clearly trigger a strong presumption of public access to the filed
settlement agreement. 77 Public disclosure of settlements in class actions and other

173. Jessup, 277 F.3d at 928 (citations omitted); see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23
F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994) (analogizing unfiled settlement to "functionally similar" unfiled
discovery).
174. Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782-83 (holding that confidentiality order was independent of settlement
terms and did not convert unfiled agreement into court record). Cf Jackson v. Delaware River & Bay
Auth., 224 F. Supp. 2d 834, 839 (D.N.J. 2002) (indicating that draft settlement memorandum became
judicial record when filed and referred to on the record).
175. See supra notes 57-74 and accompanying text (discussing litigants' potential motivations
for requesting judicial participation in their settlements). See also FJC Report, supranote 12, at 5-7
(finding that sealed settlement agreements are filed to facilitate their enforcement or to request court
approval).
176. See Ashcraft v. Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288,302 (4th Cir. 2000) (invalidating contempt order
because trial court failed to account for presumption of access to sealed settlement agreement). Even
if a court does not retain continuing jurisdiction and unconditionally dismisses the settled suit, a
settlement filed for court "approval" may nevertheless "reflect[] input by a federal judge, and so the
document is presumptively a public document." Jessup, 277 F.3d at 929-30.
177. See Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1008 (N.D.
11. 2003) (indicating that when settlement is embodied in a consent decree, the judge "must determine
that it does not offend public policy, as by harming third parties, before he can approve it").
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types of representative actions not only permits monitoring of the court's "fairness"
determination, but also notifies those represented whether the settlement is in their
best interests. 7 8
Even a settlement contract in an otherwise private case may lose its confidential
status if one of the settling parties subsequently sues to enforce or interpret its
terms.' 79 In such a case, the contents of the filed settlement would be pivotal to the
court's adjudication of the parties' substantive rights under the contract. A strong
presumption of access to the agreement would accordingly arise. 8 °
In most cases, though, only a weak presumption of public access will exist
because the settlement agreement, even if filed, plays no role in the court's
adjudication of the litigants' substantive rights.'
Other than a noninculpatory
refusal to admit or deny liability, a settlement agreement generally does not address
the underlying merits of the controversy. Its amount, terms, and conditions are farremoved from the facts, exhibits, pleadings, discovery, or other materials on which
judicial decisions are based.'82 The waning of the presumption somewhat liberates
the court's discretion concerning public access.
The litigants' need for
confidentiality and its importance in achieving settlement may well rebut the low
presumption of public access. Ultimately, the sealing decision hinges on that case-

178. See F.T.C. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-09 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding
that court's approval of consent decree created strong presumption of public access); Stalnaker v.
Novar Corp., 293 F. Supp.2d 1260, 1264 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (recognizing strong presupmtion of access
to FLSA wage settlement approved by district court); Boone v. City of Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603,
609-10 (E.D. Va. 1999) (discerning a strong presumption of access to filed back wages settlement
approved by the court); see also Friedenthal, supranote 42, at 75-76 (indicating that "heavy burden
must be placed on those who would limit access" to settlements in public cases such as class actions).
179. See In the Matter of the Application of [Sealed] to Confirm and Enforce an International
Arbitral Award, 64 F. Supp. 2d 183, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (warning litigants that "agreement to secrecy
in the arbitration" would not automatically carry over to suit seeking court assistance to enforce the
award).
180. See, e.g., Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2002)
(indicating that when parties request judicial enforcement or interpretation of confidential settlement,
"the contract enters the record of the case and thus becomes available to the public, unless it contains
information such as trade secrets that may legitimatelybe kept confidential"); Union Oil Co. v. Leavell,
220 F.3d 562,567-68 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that suit forbreach ofconfidential settlement agreement
must be conducted in public).
181. See S.E.C. v. TheStreet.Com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (analogizing unfiled
discovery to settlement documents that "do not carry a presumption of public access"); Janus Films,
Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578,582 (2dCir. 1986) (comparing court's "larger role" in entering "settlement
judgment" in representative suits with "minimal determination" required of judge in other types of
cases).
182. According to the recent FJC study, in 97 percent of the .05 percent of federal civil cases
involving sealed settlements, "the complaint is not sealed, so the public has access to information about
the alleged wrongdoers and wrongdoings." FJCReport, supra, note 12, at 9-10. Indeed, generally
"the only thing kept secret by the sealing is the amount of settlement." Id. at 10. See also Smithkline
Beecham Corp., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 1008 (permitting the sealing ofportions of settlement that contained
"legitimately confidential information to which... competitors should not be entitled and which the
American public does not need to know in order to evaluate the handling of... litigation by the
judiciary").
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specific balancing of applicable private and public interests relevant to good
83

cause. 1

The no-discretion approach of the new South Carolina federal local rule
apparently rests upon a completely contrary assumption regarding the strength of
the access presumption concerning filed settlement agreements. Indeed, in stating
that "[n]o settlement agreement filed with the Court shall be sealed,"" 4 the federal
rule renders the ordinarily qualified presumption irrebuttable.' 85 In so doing, the
rule goes too far; the rationale for public access to judicial records "support[s] a
strong presumption rather than an absolute rule."' 86
3.

"JudicialKibitzing" and Settlement

Thus far, discussion has focused upon confidentiality and sealing orders

governing unfiled discovery, factual and legal information, judicial records, and
settlement agreements generated in the course of a settled dispute. Any judicial
participation in confidential settlements, however, arguably implicates the need to
monitor our judiciary in action.' 87 As Judge Posner recently observed:
Whatever the rationale for the judge's participation in the making
of the settlement in this case, the fact and consequences of his
participation are public acts. He was not just a kibitzer. But even
if he had been, judicial kibitzing is official behavior. The public
has an interest in knowing what terms of settlement a federal
judge would approve and perhaps therefore nudge the parties to
agree to.

88

' They schedule
Judges today increasingly participate in the settlement process. 89
and direct settlement conferences,190 preside over court-annexed alternative dispute

183. See Geller v. Branic Int'l Realty Corp., 212 F.3d 734, 738 (2d Cir. 2000) (commenting on
"considerable discretion" district court enjoys in considering "a request to seal a file.., or take other
protective measures" concerning a confidential settlement).
184. D.S.C. LOCALR. 5.03(c).
185. As discussed, the seemingly unbending character of the rule may be ameliorated by the
"good cause" exception applicable to all local rules of the South Carolina district courts. See supra
note 24.
186. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002).
187. See United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1998)
(acknowledging that "[i]n a perfect world, the public would be kept abreast of all developments in the
settlement discussions of lawsuits of public interest").
188. Jessup, 277 F.3d at 929.
189. See generallyDord, Secrecy by Consent,supra note 4, at 288-95 (exploring the shift from
adjudication to settlement and the concomitant increase in judicial involvement in settlement).
190. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(9) (making facilitation of settlement a proper purpose and
subject of pretrial conferences).
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resolution proceedings,' cajole parties onto common ground, 92 and generally
manage a "cluster of dispute processes."' 93 As judicial efforts to actively promote
the private settlement of disputes intensify, so arguably does the public's need to
monitor those judicial activities.

19

'

At the same time, the success of the negotiation

process itself frequently depends upon a closed bargaining forum.'95 Resolution of
this dilemma again requires determining whether this need for confidentiality
outweighs any presumption of access to court-sponsored bargaining.
Litigants often require some assurance of confidentiality before they will fully
and frankly state bargaining positions, evaluate the strengths or weaknesses of their
respective positions, or make tentative concessions toward compromise. 96 Indeed,
the "strong public interest" favoring the "secrecy of matters discussed. .. during
settlement negotiations" recently led the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to create a
new federal common law privilege protecting such communications. 97 The court
reasoned:

In order for settlement talks to be effective, parties must feel

191. The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 requires federal district courts to authorize
the use of alternative dispute resolution in all civil cases and to implement their own alternative dispute
resolution programs. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-71 (2000).
192. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976,979 (6th Cir.
2003) (recognizing that settlement negotiations "often include specific, creative recommendations by
the Court on how to resolve disputes" in order to overcome parties' "entrenched... adversarial roles"
(quoting Order Re: Denying Petition to Vacate or Modify Confidentiality Order at 3, Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 976)).
193. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 103, at 1390 (discussing nonadjudicatory proceedings over
which courts today preside). See also Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1561, 1590-93 (2003) (discussing the "acceleration ofjudicial settlement promotion"
and its concomitant enhancement ofjudicial discretion).
194. As recognized by the Second Circuit, the judicial function now includes facilitation of
settlement:
There is no question that fostering settlement is an important Article III
function of the federal district courts. Every case must be dropped, settled or
tried, and a principal function of a trial judge is to foster an atmosphere of open
discussion among the parties' attorneys and representatives so that litigation may
be settled promptly and fairly so as to avoid the uncertainty, expense and delay
inherent in a trial.
United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Marcus,
supranote 43, at 505 n.285 (acknowledging thatjudicial promotion ofsettlement "may one day provide
a basis for allowing the public to observe judges at work on this effort"); Miller, supra note 43, at
485-86 & n.290 (recognizing argument for public access in cases involving "significant judicial
participation in the [settlement] process").
195. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 980 (discussing the need for confidentiality
in settlement negotiations); Herrnreiter v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 281 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing that motion to implement settlement could undermine confidentiality of appellate
settlement conference); Glens Falls Newspapers,Inc., 160 F.3d at 858 (recognizing need for private
forum concerning settlement negotiations).
196. See Glens FallsNewspapers,Inc., 160 F.3d at 858 (describing court-supervised settlement
conference as presenting opportunity for "frank discussion about the value of avoiding a trial").
197. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 980-81.
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uninhibited in their communications. Parties are unlikely to
propose the types of compromises that most effectively lead to
settlement unless they are confident that their proposed solutions
cannot be used on cross examination, under the ruse of
"impeachment evidence," by some future third party. Parties must
be able to abandon their adversarial tendencies to some degree.
They must be able to make hypothetical concessions, offer
creative quidpro quos, and generally make statements that would

otherwise belie their litigation efforts. Without a privilege, parties
would more often forego negotiations for the relative formality of
trial. Then, the entire negotiation process collapses upon itself,
and the judicial efficiency it fosters is lost.'98

Thus, confidentiality is of pressing importance to settlement negotiations, "whether
... done under the auspices of the court or informally between the parties."' 99 And,
as the ultimate objective of such negotiation, settlement itself serves important

public ends by promoting "a more efficient, more cost-effective, and significantly
less burdened judicial system.""
The question then becomes whether this need for confidentiality and the policy

favoring settlement rebut any presumption of access that may arise by virtue of a
"Settlement proceedings are
court's participation in settlement activities.
historically closed procedures,"' and "confidential settlement communications are

a tradition in this
country."20 2 Thus, these proceedings implicate no "tradition of
20 3
accessibility.
More significantly, court-supervised alternative dispute resolution "does not
present any matter for adjudication by the court."'" Indeed, most information
198. Id. at 980; see also Cason v. Builders Firstsource-Southeast Group, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d
242, 249 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (denying discovery of mediation and settlement documents between
employer and EEOC); Allen County, OH v. Reilly Indus., 197 F.R.D. 352, 354 (N.D. Ohio 2000)
(denying motion to compel settlement letters between litigants in environmental contamination case);
Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180-81 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(creating federal common law privilege against discovery of formal mediation proceedings).
199. GoodyearTire & Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 980.
200. Id.; see also Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (explaining that mediation privilege promotes
"conciliatory relationships among parties to a dispute," reduces "litigation costs," and decreases "size
of state and federal court dockets, thereby increasing the quality ofjustice in those cases that do not
settle voluntarily").
201. In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198, 199 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Boone v. City of
Suffolk, 79 F. Supp. 2d 603, 607 (E.D. Va. 1999) (commenting upon historically closed nature of
settlement proceedings).
202. GoodyearTire & Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 980-81.
203. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of tradition and functional
utility in access decision).
204. In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d at 199 (denying request for access to summary jury trial,
which court analogized to settlement proceedings); see also B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 300 (7th
Cir. 1995) (noting that court was not "adjudicating anyone's rights or enforcing any provision of the
consent decree" in settlement conference).
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exchanged during a typical settlement negotiation is of questionable accuracy and
relevance. Negotiations are "punctuated with numerous instances of puffing and
posturing" and are "motivated by a desire for peace rather than from a concession
of the merits of the claim."2 ' Settlement discussions are "not the product of truth
seeking" and their public disclosure would be "highly misleading. ' 20 6 When a
judge facilitates settlement, she does not exercise core judicial powers or adjudicate
any of the litigants' substantive rights.20 7 Even if judicial settlement activities
trigger a presumption of public access, then, the strength of that presumption is
negligible or weak at best.208 The countervailing interest in promoting compromise
may outweigh this frail presumption and supply good cause for closure of the
settlement proceedings.20 9
V.

CONCLUSION

The recent debate surrounding the adoption of the antisecrecy rules in South
Carolina mirrors a national controversy concerning whether courts should facilitate
or discourage confidential settlements. Certainly, a court need not blindly sign off
on unsubstantiated requests by litigants to sanction their mutual desire for secrecy.
The parties' private confidentiality agreement does not bind the court, and a
confidentiality order, if issued, need not be coextensive with the settlement terms.
Litigants have no incentive to consider the broader public interest when they settle
confidentially, and there are some cases in which nonparties possess a legitimate
interest.
At the same time, courts should not meet all stipulated requests for

205.
v. Yellow
settlement
206.
207.

Allen County, OH v. Reilly Indus., 197 F.R.D. 352, 354 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (quoting Cook
Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990)) (both denying discovery of
negotiations).
Cook, 132 F.R.D. at 554.
Cf. Boston Herald, Inc. v. Connolly, 321 F.3d 174, 181, 189 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that the

administrative process of determining eligibility for Criminal Justice Act funds related merely to court's
management role and was "far removed from the core of the judicial function" of determining litigants'
substantive rights).
208. See United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853,857 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating
that settlement discussions and documents play "negligible role" in the trial judge's exercise ofjudicial
power until presented to court for final approval); United States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F. Supp. 129,
135 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "presumption of public access in the case of settlement conferences
is ... very low indeed, if not nonexistent").

209. See generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 4, at 392-394 (discussing the sealing
of court-sponsored bargaining).
The same will probably hold true even in cases of significant public interest or those involving
a public official or entity. Although a strong presumption of access will eventually attach to the

settlement itself, the need for the litigants in such high profile cases to negotiate out of the public
limelight may prove essential to any compromise. See Glens FallsNewspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d at 856
(acknowledging trial court's "power to prevent access to settlement negotiations when necessary to
encourage the amicable resolution of disputes" (quoting City of Hartford v. Chase, 942 F.2d 130, 135
(2d Cir. 1991))); Town ofMoreau, 979 F. Supp. at 135 (finding confidential settlement negotiations
critical even in case of significant public concern).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss4/8

36

2004]

Dore: Settlement,
Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina's Ne 827
SETTLEMENT, SECRECY, AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

confidentiality with knee-jerk rejection or adopt a "one size fits all" approach to
confidential settlements. Party autonomy and the promotion of settlement are
important values in our civil justice system that, in many cases, might justify some
form of confidentiality or sealing order.
Informed judicial discretion, exercised on a case-by-case basis by a court
cognizant of the competing interests implicated by secrecy orders, thus offers the
best solution to the perceived crisis of court secrecy. The public and private
considerations that comprise "good cause," together with the guiding purpose for
open courts, will sufficiently restrain that discretion and, hopefully, lead to the
appropriate balance between privacy and public disclosure.
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